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G.: Torts--Assumption of Risk--Workmen's Compensation
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
sel to create error far reversal, since under this rule both sides
would have an equal right to a trial free of substantial error.
The point is not important for West Virginia lawyers, since
a statute such as the one involved here would necessitate an amendment to our state constitution. There are two existing provisions
which, bear on the problem, one forbidding double jeopardy, and
the other forbidding the retrial of any point decided by a jury
otherwise than by the rules of the common law, which would exclude any such procedure as this." "Double jeopardy" has been
construed by our court to mean empaneling more than one jury
in a single case, in accord with the majority rule.' Under these
provisions there could be no West Virginia statute permitting the
state to appeal in criminal cases.
C. A. P. Jn.
TORTS - ASSuIPTION OF RiS - WORKAIEN'S COMPENSATION
- NONSUBSoRIBERS. - A, an employee in the wholesale house of
D, was present when D instructed X to open a trap door in the
floor, the two by four foot opening being located in the hal which
was ten feet wide directly opposite the door to D's office in which
A worked, directly in front of the door of the candy storeroom,
and just inside the building's main door which was at one end of
the hall. X removed the trap door and placed boxes containing
groceries around the opening as a protection. Later the same day,
A, on her way to the candy room to get a piece of candy, an act
which D had expressly forbidden his employees to do, fell into the
hole and was killed. D though eligible was not a subscriber to the
workmen's compensation fund, and was thus deprived of his common law defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of
risk. In action for negligence brought by P, administrator of A,
against D, verdict and judgment were given for P. D brings error.
Held, that the question of negligence is one for the jury, and the
court will not disturb its verdict. Judgment affirmed. Thorn v.
Addison Bros. & Smith.'
The holding in the Thorn case is a striking example of the extent to which the courts of West Virginia may go in imposing a
8 W. VA. CoNsT. art. III, § 5: "1...
nor shall any person ... be twice put
in jeopardy of life or liberty for the same offense." Id. at art. III, § 13:
"No fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined than according to the
rules of the common-law."
9 Ex parte Bornee, 76 W. Va. 360, 85 S. E. 529, L. R. A. 1915F 1093 (1915).
'194 S. E. 771 (W. Va. 1937).
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duty of care on employers who are eligible for but who are not
subscribers to the state workmen's compensation fund, or who
are subscribers thereto but are not complying fully with the requirements of the compensation statute at the time of an injury to
an employee.2 The statute still requires that there be some wrongful act or neglect on the part ;f the nonsubscriber before liability
will be imposed, 3 thereby giving rise to the interesting queltion of
4
the effect, if any, which the abolition of the common law defenses
of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fello w servant rule has on the standard of care required of employers in
this class of cases. In a situation such as that in the principal
case, the same facts which constitute contributory negligence on the
part of the decedent or an assumption of risk by her may indicate
that there is no duty owing to this particular employee, or, if such
duty does exist, that it has been performed. The English case of
gives voice to this view by saying, "The
Tlwmas v. Quartermaine
duty of an occupier of premises which have an element of danger
upon them reaches its vanishing point in the case of those who are
cognizant of the full extent of the danger, and voluntarily run the
risk". Reasoning along this same line in the case of De Francesco
v. Piney Mining Co., 6 also an action against a nonsubscriber, the
West Virginia court concluded that the duty of a mine operator
to instruct an employee as to the dangers of picking up a lighted
stick of dynamite, though it appeared to be extinguished, ended
where the bounds of the employee's negligence began. However,
if this theory of assumption of risk and contributory negligence
were applied to the facts of the principal case, it might seem that
the court would be indirectly giving effect to these defenses, an
act which it is forbidden by statute to do directly. Whatever be
the theory of our court concerning negligence in actions against
nonsubscribers to the compensation fund, it is clear that in mostc. 23, art. 2, § 8.
c. 23, art. 2, § 8. Watts v. Ohio Valley Elee. By.
Co., 78 W. Va. 144, 88 S. E. 659 (1916).
2 W. VA. RV. CODE (1931)

a W. VA.

Rv. CODE (1931)

4 W. VA. Rv. CODE (1931)

c. 23, art. 2,

§

8.

L. R. 18 Q. B. 685 (1887).
8 76 W. Va. 756, 86 S. E. 777 (1915); Note (1916) 23 W. VA. L. Q. 187.
7 Holding that the question is for the jury: Holton v. Clayco Gas Co., 106
NA.Va. 394, 145 S. E. 637 (1928) ; Estep v. Price, 93 W. Va. 81, 115 S. E. 861
(1923); Barr v. Knotts, 101 W. Va. 440, 133 S. E. 114 (1926). But of. Wilkins
v. Koppers Co., 84 W. Va. 460, 100 S. E. 300 (1919), reversing the jury

verdict.
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of such cases the question of negligence will be left to the jury, and
its finding will not be disturbed by the court.
A. F. G.

TRUSTS

-

DISTiNcTioN

BETWEEN DEBT AND TRUST ARRANGEA, trustee for B and 0 under a will,

iN BANxK DEPosIT. deposited trust funds in D bank as a sinking fund for emergency
calls for taxes and other charges against the corpus of the trust
property. The money so deposited consisted of 15% of the rentals
from the trust res. A and D entered into a "trust agreement",
calling the deposit a "trust", A a "trustor", and D a trustee".
The deposit so created was subject to withdrawal by order of A,
and yielded 4Y2% interest. After the hirst two deposits the account was recorded not in the trust department of D but in the
savings department. Tax returns were filed on it, in accordance
with the custom as to deposits generally, but not as to trusts.
Periodical statements were rendered instead of giving A a passbook, because "we are regarding it not as a deposit but as a trust",
to quote the language of the president of the bank concerning the
agreement. D failed, and the question arose on suit by A, B, and
C, against B, the receiver of D, to hold him as trustee of this account and to gain priority over creditors of D in .the distribution
of assets, whether the arrangement between A and D created a
debt or a trust. Held, that the deposit in question created a debt
rather than a trust. Bowne v. Lamb.'
The court pointed out that the solution depends on the manifested intention of the parties. In this case they spoke of a trust,
but their actions spoke louder than their words, since the arrangement partook of the essential characteristics of a debt rather than
of a trust. The arrangement for interest is controlling unless the
intention of the parties is clear, and sufficient to create a trust
anyway. Here the parties attempted to create a trust, and wanted
the arrangement to be a trust, but failed in the essential points of
the arrangement to overcome the presumption that a bank deposit
is a debt rather than a trust. Therefore plaintiffs, not having sufficiently specified that the funds should remain intact, are not entitled to any preference, in the absence of 'any showing that D was
insolvent at the time of the deposit, or of a deposit ex maleficio.
The case was decided under the controlling authority of CftMIENT

1193 S. B. 563 (W. Va. 1937).
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